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MORE THAN #FREEBRITNEY: REMEDYING
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN
GUARDIANSHIP FOR PEOPLE WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
Hannah Shotwell*

Adult guardianship is used as a method to restrict the decisionmaking rights of some individuals with intellectual or
developmental disabilities who have been deemed “incompetent.”
However, the use of guardianship to remove someone’s decisionmaking rights violates the equal protection rights granted by the
New Mexico Constitution. Discrimination against people with
developmental disabilities must be substantially related to an
important governmental interest, and the current state of
guardianship fails to meet that bar. Further, guardianship violates
the state constitutional guarantee of due process because it
infringes on the fundamental right to the least restrictive means of
care. New Mexico must adopt the less restrictive alternative of
supported decision-making as the default to restricting the
decision-making rights of people with developmental disabilities
to rectify its unconstitutional use of guardianship.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine having your right to vote, to get married, to choose where you want
to live, to choose who you socialize with, taken away. Imagine being found
“incapacitated” by a judge who refuses to hear what you have to say because you
have a disability. Imagine having to ask someone you do not know for permission to
use your own money. Imagine being held hostage, physically restrained, and
segregated from your friends and family. This is the reality for some individuals with
developmental and intellectual disabilities who are confined within an adult
guardianship.1

*

J.D. Candidate, University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2023. I would like to thank
Professors Carol Suzuki and J. Walker Boyd and well as my colleagues on the journal for their invaluable
review and feedback. Special thanks to Molly Samsell for her thoughtful peer edits of this Comment.
Thank you also to Professors Jim Ellis and Ann Delpha for encouraging me to pursue this topic, as well
as to my dad, Jim Shotwell, for his work with people with I/DD in New Mexico that sparked my interest
in advocacy for this group. Finally, I am beyond grateful to Elisa Ciblis who put up with many late-night
pleas for help and provided me with incredible amounts of guidance and support throughout this entire
process.
1. This loss of rights was the experience of Michael Lincoln-McCreight, a 26-year-old with a
developmental disability in Florida who was placed in a plenary guardianship when he turned 18 and aged
out of foster care. Reina Sultan, The Horror of an Unwanted Conservatorship, According to People Who
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Guardianship derives from the English common law concept of parens
patriae, in which the state is obligated to care for those who cannot care for
themselves.2 Thus, courts grant “guardians” the legal authority to make decisions on
behalf a person with “profoundly limited ability to protect themselves . . . “.3 In the
last five years, New Mexico’s guardianship laws and practices have been the subject
of scrutiny from disability rights activists, the media, and the public due to reports
of egregious abuse.4 Then, in 2020, guardianship abuses became nationally relevant
when pop icon Britney Spears spoke publicly about the financial and emotional
abuse she suffered under the control of a conservator5 since 2008.6 Currently, New
Mexico defaults by statute to a limited form of adult guardianship when someone
formally petitions the court seeking the appointment of a guardian for an individual
allegedly “in need of protection.”7 This limitation on the scope of guardianship
theoretically protects the rights of the individual in need of support. However, though
the state guardianship statutory scheme requires guardianships shall not be imposed
if there is a less restrictive alternative that would meet the individual’s needs,8
guardianships in which the guardian has the power to make all decisions for the
protected person are imposed far more often than other types of less restrictive
interventions.9 Guardianship removes considerable, and even fundamental, rights
from an individual. Despite this, people with limited decision-making capacity who
need support and who are eligible for guardianship under New Mexico law continue
to have their civil rights unnecessarily and discriminatorily restricted by the
imposition of guardianships. For New Mexico to honor its duty to provide support
for individuals with limited capacity, and to honor these individuals, the state must
take steps to expand the scope of work performed by existing public guardianship
programs to include the provision of less restrictive alternatives to guardianship.
Under the New Mexico Constitution, people with developmental
disabilities have a right to the least restrictive means of intervention and the right to
be free from unlawful discrimination. Moreover, the current system of guardianship
in New Mexico violates the equal protection and substantive due process rights of
Lived It, VICE (Jul. 8, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/epn57n/what-its-like-to-liveunder-a-conservatorship-or-guardianship-britney-spears.
2. Erica Wood, History of Guardianship, in GUARDIANSHIP OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING JUSTICE,
AUTONOMY, AND SAFETY 17–48 (Mary Joy Quinn ed., 2005).
3. David Godfrey, Challenges in Guardianship and Guardianship Abuse, 42 BIFOCAL 84 (2021).
4. An investigative series published by the Albuquerque Journal led to considerable reform of New
Mexico’s system of adult guardianship. See Diane Dimond, Who Guards the Guardians: A Series by
Diane
Dimond,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (last
updated
Mar.
13,
2017,
8:22
AM),
https://www.abqjournal.com/898385/who-guards-the-guardians-a-5-part-series-by-diane-dimond.html.
5. Though definitions vary by state, in New Mexico a guardian is appointed for the protection of a
person, while a conservator is appointed for the protection of property. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-101(A)
(2021). In Britney Spears’ case, her “conservator” was a guardian under New Mexico’s definition.
6. Liz Day, Samantha Stark & Joe Coscarelli, Britney Spears Quietly Pushed for Years to End Her
Conservatorship, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/arts/music/britneyspears-conservatorship.html.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (2021).
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-304(C)(4) (2021).
9. Lucy Beadnell & Jonathan Martiniz, Rethinking Guardianship and Substitute Decision Making:
Supported Decision-Making and the Reform of Virginia Law, Policy, and Practice to Protect Rights and
Ensure Choice, 39 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH 1, 4 (2020).
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people with developmental disabilities that are guaranteed by the state constitution.
Legal recognition of supported decision-making, a less restrictive alternative to
guardianship that allows a person with developmental disabilities to make their own
decisions instead of having a guardian make decisions for them,10 and
implementation of a statutory requirement that less restrictive alternatives to
guardianship be tried and exhausted before the implementation of guardianships is
the appropriate remedy for these constitutional violations.
In this Comment, I will first address how New Mexico’s system of
guardianship fails to treat people with I/DD equitably and to place people with I/DD
in the least restrictive form of intervention. Second, this comment aims to address
potential constitutional violations in the provision of guardianship. I will discuss how
Supreme Court precedent lacks the protection necessary to challenge guardianship
laws. Then, I will consider how greater protections within the New Mexico
Constitution are robust enough to protect people with I/DD from unwarranted
placement in guardianship. Finally, I will address possible statutory and private
remedies to the unconstitutionality of guardianship. The impacts of guardianship
abuse and exploitation are tragic and unimaginable, and the state must do more to
prevent the cruelty people in need of supports often suffer.
II.

BACKGROUND

The group of people with disabilities addressed in this Comment are
individuals with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities (I/DD) subject to
guardianship under New Mexico law. New Mexico’s statutory definition of I/DD is
a “severe chronic disability of an individual, which . . . is attributable to a mental or
physical impairment, including the result from trauma to the brain, or combination
of mental and physical impairments.”11 The disability must manifest “before the
person reaches the age of twenty-two” and must “continue indefinitely.”12
Additionally, the disability must result in substantial functional limitations in areas
of “major life activity,” including self-care, learning, mobility, capacity for
independent living, economic self-sufficiency, and receptive and expressive
language capabilities.13 Finally, a developmental disability, as defined in New
Mexico, “reflects the person’s need for a combination and sequence of special,
interdisciplinary or generic care treatment or other support and services that are of
lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.”14
Examples of I/DD may include autism, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and brain
injuries occurring before the age of twenty-two.15 Though people without experience
working with people with I/DD often consider this class of individuals to be uniform,
10. What
is
Supported
Decision-Making?,
CTR.
FOR
PUB.
REPRESENTATION,
https://supporteddecisions.org/about-supported-decision-making/.
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-16A-6(A)(1) (2021).
12. Id. § 28-16A-6(A)(2)–(3) (2021).
13. Id. § 28-16A-6(A)(4) (2021).
14. Id. § 28-16A-6(A)(5) (2021).
15. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY: HOW GUARDIANSHIP AND
ALTERNATIVES IMPACT THE AUTONOMY OF PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 21 (Jun. 10, 2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Turning-Rights-intoReality_508_0.pdf [hereinafter TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY].
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individuals with I/DD experience varied functional impairments and adaptive
deficits.16 Moreover, capacity levels impaired by I/DD are not fixed but instead can
develop and change due to a variety of therapeutic strategies, life experiences, and
time.17 People with I/DD do not have homogenous needs and interests.
Further, this Comment will consider recognition of the right to the “least
restrictive alternative” of intervention or supports. The “least restrictive
alternative”18 doctrine arose from the movement to limit involuntary civil
commitment for individuals with mental illness and I/DD.19 The doctrine is based on
the premise that support and treatment for people with I/DD and mental illness”
should be provided in the least restrictive setting possible” (e.g., in the community
versus in an institution).20 When using the least restrictive alternative doctrine to
consider forms of intervention for people with I/DD, this Comment will refer to the
least restrictive form of “support” or “intervention” rather than the least restrictive
form of “treatment.” This distinction is necessary as there is no cure for I/DD, and
I/DD is not something that is “wrong” with an individual that needs to be fixed.
Rather, I/DD is a personal characteristic that the individual can manage or minimize
with appropriate support.21
A.

New Mexico Guardianship Proceedings

In some cases, adults with I/DD are subject to guardianship as a method to
control and limit their actions and decision-making capabilities in the name of
protection. Guardianship is a legal process where a court removes some or many of
the legal and decision-making rights from an individual and transfers those rights to
another person, a “guardian.”22 Guardianships can be either plenary or limited—
plenary guardianship is a “full” guardianship where the court gives the guardian the
power to exercise all delegable legal rights and duties on behalf of the person within
the guardianship, whereas limited guardianship only provides a guardian with
authority granted explicitly by court order and the person under guardianship retains
the rights not granted to the guardian.23 By statute, New Mexico defaults to the latter
“limited guardianships.”24

16. See, e.g., Brief for the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities &
the ARC of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 19, Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct.
1039 (2017) No. 15-797.
17. TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY, supra note 15, at 21.
18. The “least restrictive alternative” standard used in consideration of support for people with I/DD
is not to be confused with the concept of the “least restrictive means” test in constitutional law. For
discussion of the constitutional “least restrictive means” test, see infra Part III.A.1.
19. RISDON N. SLATE, JACQUELINE K. BUFFINGTON-VOLLUM & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 35 (2d ed.
2013).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., PSEUDOSCIENCE IN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHOTHERAPY: A SKEPTICAL FIELD
GUIDE (2019) (ed. Stephen Hupp).
22. TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY, supra note 15, at 23.
23. Id. at 11.
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (2021).
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In New Mexico, guardianship proceedings are triggered when someone
formally petitions the district court seeking the appointment of a guardianship for a
person in need of protection.25 Then, the district court appoints a guardian ad litem,
a court visitor, and a qualified healthcare professional as a safeguard for the alleged
incapacitated person’s rights.26 A guardian ad litem is an attorney appointed to
represent and protect the rights of the alleged incapacitated person; it is their job to
ensure that a guardian is appointed only if guardianship is the least restrictive method
of intervention that serves individual’s needs.27 The court visitor is a social worker
(or other similar professional) who reports on the needs of the person believed to be
incapacitated and the appropriateness of the guardianship.28 Finally, the qualified
health care professional describes the protected person’s level of intellectual and
developmental functioning and whether there may be a deficit in any area.29 After
the appointment of these parties, they each must file a report with the court before
the day of the hearing concerning the capacity of the alleged incapacitated person.30
These reports are intended to protect the alleged incapacitated person’s rights from
being unwarrantably abridged by providing the court with a basis of understanding
of the person’s capacity.
However, the way court-appointed professionals make capacity
determinations is deeply problematic. In general, physicians and psychiatrists
provide opinions that are based largely on generalities of a person’s diagnosis rather
than on any observable trait of the particular individual.31 Further, even if they have
a clinical basis for determining an individual’s capacity, the experts that make these
determinations may not have sufficient legal context to determine whether the
individual is incapacitated as the law defines it.32 Determinations of capacity are
further complicated by New Mexico’s statutory preference for limited guardianships.
Preference for limited guardianships means that “physicians not only have to make
a medical diagnosis, assess the person’s functional abilities, and determine capacity
in light of a legal standard they might not fully understand, they have to repeat this
process with respect to each right that may be removed from the person.”33 Despite
these complexities in determining capacity, the professional’s opinion is usually
given great deference by the court.34
If the judge finds the individual incapacitated, the district court determines
whether a limited or full guardianship is appropriate.35 A court can find a person
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. § 45-5-303(A) (2021).
Id. § 45-5-303(D)–(F) (2021).
Id. §§ 45-5-303(D), -303.1 (2021).
Id. § 45-5-303(F)(1)–(3) (2021).
Id. § 45-5-303(E)(1)–(2) (2021).
Id. §§ 45-5-303(E), (F), -301.1(7) (2021).
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: TOWARD ALTERNATIVES THAT
PROMOTE
GREATER
SELF-DETERMINATION
77–78
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Guardianship_Report_Accessible.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND
GUARDIANSHIP].
32. Id. at 78 (“In one study, only 30 percent of doctors were able to correctly apply the definition of
legal competence (capacity) in a fact-pattern drawn from an actual legal case.”).
33. Id. at 78–79.
34. Id. at 79.
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-304 (2021).

518

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

“incapacitated” due to I/DD when the individual demonstrates either partial or
complete functional impairment by reason of a “mental deficiency, physical illness
or disability” to the extent the individual is unable to manage their personal affairs,
financial affairs, or both.36 New Mexico statute imposes limited guardianships by
default, and “an incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed retains
all legal and civil rights except those which have been expressly limited . . . or have
been specifically granted to the guardian by the court.”37 The state guardianship
statute emphasizes that courts should only use guardianship when necessary “to
promote and to protect the well[-]being of the person . . . and shall be ordered only
to the extent necessitated by the person’s actual functional mental and physical
limitations.”38
In fact, guardianships are only permissible if the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence “there are no available alternative resources that are suitable
with respect to the alleged incapacitated person’s welfare, safety, and rehabilitation
[and] the guardianship is appropriate as the least restrictive form of intervention
consistent with the preservation of the civil rights and liberties of the alleged
incapacitated person.”39 Despite this, courts often do not take advantage of the option
of, and statutory default to, limited guardianship and as such rarely limit a guardian’s
authority.40 Most guardianship orders are not time-limited and remain in effect until
the person subject to guardianship dies or until a court modifies the order, even
though a person with I/DD’s capacity can change over time.41 Courts often make
assessments of incapacity based on stereotypes that lead them to undervalue the
competencies and credibility of people with I/DD.42 Courts also may not make the
proper distinction between what they perceive as the rationality of a person’s
decision and what that person’s actual ability to make a decision is.43 Thus, even the
statutory preference for limited guardianship is not enough to keep people with I/DD
from being forced into guardianships when pervasive stereotypes about I/DD exist,
despite available less restrictive alternatives and a statutory preference for limited
guardianship.

36. Id. § 45-5-101 (2021)
37. Id. § 45-5-301.1 (2021); see also Maureen A. Sanders & Kathryn Wissel, Limited Guardianship
for the Mentally Retarded, 8 N.M. L. REV. 231 (1978).
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (2021).
39. Id. § 45-5-304(C)(3)–(4).
40. BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 36.
41. Id. at 89. Modification of guardianships are rare, perhaps in an effort to “promote judicial
economy” and avoid further judicial consideration of the matter. Id.
42. Id. See also TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY, supra note 15, at 70 (“An attorney described an
interaction she once had with a judge: ‘I think of a conversation with a judge . . . about a person with
Down syndrome. The judge told me that of course anyone with Down [syndrome] should have a guardian
by virtue of the diagnosis.’”).
43. BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 89. Other factors include the court wanting to err on
the side of protection, experiencing difficulties in determining the exact areas of decision-making in need
of assistance, desiring to avoid confusion about the scope of the guardian’s authority, and wishing to
promote judicial economy by avoiding future proceedings to expand the scope. Id.
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Guardianship always puts the rights of a person deemed incapacitated at
risk, regardless whether it is plenary or limited.44 Though in New Mexico a protected
person does not automatically lose all of their rights,45 a court can grant guardians
the right to consent to (or to withhold consent from) medical or other professional
care, counsel, treatment, or service on behalf of the protected person.46 Still other
rights can be removed and transferred to a guardian who can exercise these rights on
behalf of the individual, such as the right to apply for government benefits, to manage
money or property, and to decide where to live and with whom to associate.47
Guardians even have the authority to pursue divorce on behalf of a protected
person.48 Because of its legal implications on an individual’s civil rights, courts must
recognize guardianship as “an extraordinary intervention in a person’s life and
affairs” and, as such, an option of last resort.49
To protect the rights of individuals in need of support, courts should first
explore and exhaust alternatives that are chosen and able to be canceled or changed
by the people with disabilities themselves, and are thus inherently less restrictive
than options, like guardianship, that limit the input of the individual.50 If the court
finds these supports to be ineffective in ensuring the individual’s well-being, then
guardianship can be considered.51 Guardianship can be a necessary, and is sometimes
even a lifesaving, measure for people with I/DD who are unable to care for
themselves, manage their finances, or make medical decisions. However, the
shortfalls of guardianship have left at-risk adults susceptible to abuse, neglect, and
exploitation.52
The experiences of people with I/DD who are confined within
guardianships are notably absent, both within the state and nationally, from recent
conversations about reform. For example, while New Mexico has experienced and
exposed some of the most prominent cases of guardianship abuse—employees of
two local guardianship firms embezzled a combined $15 million from their elderly

44. By definition, guardianships are used to remove some decision-making rights from individuals
deemed incapacitated. See TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY, supra note 15, at 23.
45. For example, the right to marry, to vote, to practice religion, to control personal spending money,
etc. is retained by the protected person. See ELLEN LEITZER ET AL., THE HANDBOOK FOR GUARDIANS AND
CONSERVATORS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NEW MEXICO LAW 1 (Merri Rudd, ed., 2007).
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B)(3) (2021).
47. Id.
48. Nelson v. Nelson, 1994-NMCA-074, ¶ 20, 118 N.M. 17, 878 P.2d 335.
49. TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY, supra note 15, at 25.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id.
52. Press Release, New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, Gov. Lujan Grisham Authorizes
Measure Strengthening Guardian Oversight to Protect Vulnerable Adults (Apr. 8, 2021)
(https://www.governor.state.nm.us/2021/04/08/gov-lujan-grisham-authorizes-measure-strengtheningguardian-oversight-to-protect-vulnerable-adults/). For example, guardians are often legally empowered to
liquidate wards’ assets to pay their own bills. In New Mexico, owners of Ayudando Guardians embezzled
$10 million from more than 800 clients. Heidi Blake & Katie J.M. Baker, Beyond Britney: Abuse,
Exploitation, and Death Inside America’s Guardianship Industry, BUZZFEED NEWS, (Sep. 17, 2021, 1:02
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/heidiblake/conservatorship-investigation-free-britneyspears.
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clients and restricted their ability to interact with friends and family53—consideration
of the abuses faced by adults with I/DD in guardianships is lacking. On a national
scale, throughout 2020 and 2021 guardianship abuses captured national attention as
Britney Spears spoke publicly about the rights her conservatorship denied her,
including her reproductive rights, her ability to get married, and her choice in
medications she had to take, despite adverse side effects.54 While Spears’ experience
with her conservator broadly raised awareness of the issue of guardianship abuses,55
her public presence and access to a large audience made her restoration of rights all
the more likely—a resource that most people trapped in guardianships do not have.
It is impossible to quantify the scope of abuse by guardians. However, this abuse is
certainly not limited to corporate guardians exploiting wealthy clients in their care,
or to individuals in the public eye; these abuses are a devastating reality for many
under the control of a guardian. This Comment aims to give consideration to this
group of people who have suffered in silence.
Recent New Mexico state legislative reforms to the institution of
guardianship attempt to curb neglect, abuse, and exploitation. Still, these reforms do
little to address how and why guardianships begin. For example, after a 2021
amendment to the state’s guardianship statute, judges must be informed by a
petitioner whether any less restrictive alternatives are available before turning over
an incapacitated person’s life and bank account to the control of a guardian.56 In spite
of these reforms, guardianship problems persist because reform has not addressed
errors when people who have been deemed incapacitated, but for whom guardianship
is not appropriate, are “involuntarily, and unwarrantably placed into a guardianship
in the first place.”57 It is impossible to predict how the new statutory requirements
will impact the civil rights of people with I/DD who face guardianship in the longterm. However, the measures do not go far enough in rectifying and preventing the
abuses suffered by protected persons. The reforms do not ensure that people with
I/DD receive support through the least restrictive means available, nor do they ensure
that people with I/DD will not face discriminatory placement in guardianships.
B.

The Supported Decision-Making Model

One of the least restrictive alternatives to guardianship is supported
decision-making (SDM), a model in which individuals with I/DD whose decision-

53. Dillon Bergin, Vulnerable New Mexico Elders Find Themselves Trapped in Guardianship,
SANTA
FE
NEW
MEXICAN
(Apr.
4,
2022),
https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/vulnerable-new-mexico-elders-find-themselvestrapped-in-guardianship/article_d7d7f4ac-7227-11eb-aa44-938efda28c8b.html.
54. Ronan Farrow & Jia Tolentino, Britney Spears’s Conservatorship Nightmare, THE NEW YORKER
(Jul. 3, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/american-chronicles/britney-spears-conservatorshipnightmare/.
55. See, e.g., Blake & Baker, supra note 52.
56. These reforms include increasing oversight by court auditors and the creation of a pilot program
wherein “volunteer court visitors will meet with those under guardianship . . . to ensure their welfare.”
Editorial: New Guardianship Law Adds Oversight, Favors Alternatives, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 17, 2021,
12:02 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/2391336/new-guardianship.html.
57. Dillon Bergin, “The Court Has Plans for You,” SEARCHLIGHT NEW MEXICO (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://searchlightnm.org/the-court-has-plans-for-you/.
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making autonomy might otherwise be limited or removed make and communicate
their own decisions in any number of formal and informal arrangements, with
support from trusted family and friends.58 There is no uniform model of SDM, but
generally supported decision-making is flexible in how it is applied to an individual’s
specific circumstances, and in how it is applied to the same person over time.59 A
supported decision-making agreement can only exist if the person with I/DD chooses
it and is comfortable with their designated supporters.60 The person within a SDM
agreement retains their full legal capacity, can revoke the agreement at any time, and
must be consulted by their representative before any decisions can be finalized.61 A
person using supported decision-making identifies what types of decisions they want
help with and chooses people they trust to help them understand, make, and
communicate those decisions.62 Although SDM agreements usually involve a single
decision-making supporter, private supported decision-making relationships may
also occur in a “circle of support” of friends and family or a “microboard” of an
organization acting as the supporter for an individual with a disability.63
While many individuals engage in informal forms of supported decisionmaking, others benefit from documenting various provisions in a formal agreement,
including the names and roles of supporters and details about the scope of their
assistance, authority, and duties.64 Formalizing supported decision-making can help
ensure that the choices of people with I/DD are respected. These agreements serve
as documentation that a person can make their own informed decisions.
While there is not a uniform approach to legal recognition of SDM, several
states have adopted statutes enacting SDM as an alternative to guardianship.65 For
example, Rhode Island’s Supported Decision-Making Act legally recognizes SDM
agreements that follow a statutorily recognized form66 and that are signed by each
party to the agreement in the presence of witnesses.67 An adult with I/DD can only
enter into an agreement voluntarily and without undue influence.68 Under the statute,
any decision or request made with the assistance of a supporter within an agreement
shall be recognized as the decision or request of the principal.69 Individuals are
presumed to have legal capacity, and execution of a SDM agreement cannot be used
as evidence of incapacity.70 Finally, an individual may revoke a SDM agreement at

58. Zachary Allen & Dari Pogach, More States Pass Supported Decision-Making Agreement Laws,
41(1) BIFOCAL 159, 160 (2019).
59. What is Supported Decision-Making?, DISABILITY RTS. CTR. N.H. (Fall 2021),
https://drcnh.org/flyers/what-is-supported-decision-making/.
60. Id.
61. Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A
Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 177 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1122 (2013).
62. What is Supported Decision-Making?, supra note 59.
63. Kohn, Blumenthal & Campbell, supra note 61, at 1123.
64. Allen & Pogach, supra note 58, at 160.
65. Id. at 159.
66. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-66.13-10 (West 2021).
67. Id. § 42-66.13-5 (West 2021).
68. Id. § 42-66.13-7 (West 2021).
69. Id. § 42-66.13-7 (West 2021).
70. Id. § 42-66.13-4 (West 2021).
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any time.71 Such statutes remove the problematic determinations of capacity that
plague guardianship schemes72 and allow individuals with I/DD to maintain their
autonomy.
However, as with any method of influence being exerted over vulnerable
populations, including people with I/DD, supported decision-making comes with its
own set of risks. For example, there are concerns supporters could use agreements
“to unduly influence or exploit” the individual with I/DD.73 There are also concerns
that formal SDM agreements may unnecessarily formalize a decision-making model
that works better as an informal arrangement.74 However, supported decision-making
has the potential to provide individuals with I/DD the help they may need to manage
their affairs and make decisions about their own lives, and, by doing so, improve
their well-being and promote their dignity.75 There are real problems with the current
guardianship system which may be diminished by recognition of supported decisionmaking as a less restrictive available.76
By legally recognizing supported decision-making as a less restrictive
alternative to guardianship, New Mexico can offer a form of decision-making
restraint that does not violate the right of people with I/DD to the least restrictive
form of intervention and to be free from unconstitutional discrimination. If an
individual with I/DD can meet their needs through SDM, there is no reason to strip
the individual of their rights by imposing a guardianship.77
III.

ANALYSIS

New Mexico’s statutory preference for limited guardianship has little
practical effect on restraining the ability of courts to remove someone’s rights. First,
there is an overuse of plenary guardianships, despite statutory directives favoring
limited guardianships.78 This overreliance is likely attributable to stereotypes about
people with I/DD that foster a presumption of incapacity.79 Second, there is a “lack
of explicit statutory authority for less restrictive arrangements,” such as supported
decision-making.80 Third, the burden is on the guardian ad litem to present less
restrictive alternatives at a guardianship hearing, and it is at the judge’s discretion to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. § 42-66-13.5(g) (West 2021).
See supra Part II.A.
Allen & Pogach, supra note 58, at 161.
See generally Kohn, Blumenthal & Campbell, supra note 61.
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Nina A. Kohn, Legislating Supported Decision-Making, 58 HARV. J. LEGIS. 313, 349–50 (2021).
Ellen Pinnes & Jim Jackson, Guardianship 101, NEW MEXICO LEGISLATURE: DISABILITIES
CONCERNS
SUBCOMMITTEE
(Sep.
24,
2019),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Committee/Handouts_List?CommitteeCode=DISC&Date=9/24/2019. There
are empirical studies using national data that support the finding that plenary guardianships are overused,
and statutory preference for limited guardianship does not mean that judges will use it. See, e.g., Pamela
B. Teaster, Erica F. Wood, Winsor C. Schmidt, Jr. & Susan A. Lawrence, Public Guardianship After 25
Years: In the Best Interests of Incapacitated People?, A.B.A. COMM. ON LAW AND AGING (2007). The
statistical overuse of plenary guardianship in New Mexico is beyond the scope of this Comment.
79. Pinnes & Jackson, supra note 78.
80. Id.
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determine if those less restrictive alternatives are truly insufficient.81 While the court
appointed guardian ad litem’s duty is to represent the alleged incapacitated person
and present that person’s position to the court, in practice they act as a neutral role
with the potential protected person’s “best interests” in mind, with minimal
consideration of the concerns of the individual facing guardianship.82 Moreover,
judges often rely on stereotypes to determine a person’s decision-making capacity,
rather than considering the actual capacity of the person.83 Having an intellectual
disability does not automatically mean an individual lacks the ability to care for
themselves or to make their own decisions.84 However, this nuance is not often
considered by courts.
In the following two sections, I will first explore how United States
constitutional protections under equal protection and due process fail to protect this
group of individuals. Second, I will discuss how the state guardianship statute
violates New Mexico’s greater constitutional equal protection rights for individuals
with I/DD. Finally, I will demonstrate that the fundamental right to the least
restrictive means of intervention can be found in the due process clause of the state
constitution and show that guardianship violates this right for people with I/DD.
Retaining guardianship, limited or plenary, as a statutory default to remove
the decision-making abilities of people with I/DD will always violate these
individuals’ equal protection and substantive due process rights. New Mexico’s
guardianship statutory scheme unnecessarily and unconstitutionally discriminates
against individuals with I/DD. As the state attempts to remedy guardianship abuses
through statutory reform, it must consider recognizing a new default form of
decision-making restraints. New Mexicans have a constitutional right to the least
restrictive form of treatment and a right to be free from discrimination—and
guardianship violates both of these rights.85
The United States Constitution grants individuals certain, limited rights that
cannot be abridged by government action. The New Mexico Constitution, however,
provides greater protections than its federal counterpart in many areas.86 As it exists
currently, New Mexico’s provision of guardianship for people with I/DD violates
both their substantive due process right to the least restrictive means of intervention
and their equal protection right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
disability. While these rights exist under the United States Constitution, federal
courts have declined to extend a higher level of scrutiny to individuals with I/DD

81. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-303(D), -303.1, -304 (2021).
82. Id.
83. BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 89.
84. See, e.g., Autonomy, Decision-Making Supports, and Guardianship: Joint Position Statement of
AAIDD and the Arc, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
https://www.aaidd.org/news-policy/policy/position-statements/autonomy-decision-making-supportsand-guardianship (adopted Mar. 16, 2016).
85. Guardianship statutory schemes could also potentially be challenged as violating the Americans
with Disabilities Act’s mandate requiring that public entities provide services in the least restrictive setting
appropriate for the individual. See Kohn, supra note 77, at 355. However, consideration of the ADA is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
86. State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18–19, 140 N.M. 245, 142 P.3d 933.
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facing restrictive means of treatment.87 Thus, the only constitutional remedy
available to individuals with I/DD who are unnecessarily subjected to guardianship
under New Mexico state law in violation of their constitutional rights is through the
state constitution.
A.

United States Constitutional Protections
1.

Due Process

Under the due process clauses of the United States Constitution’s Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the federal and state governments are prohibited from
depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”88 The
Supreme Court has found that these due process guarantees protect certain
substantive rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution, but are “deeply rooted
in [the] Nation’s history and tradition.”89 These previously recognized fundamental
rights include the right to marry,90 aspects of parental autonomy,91 and the right to
bodily integrity.92 Any state action infringing on these “substantive,” or fundamental,
rights is prohibited unless the infringement is “narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest” (“strict scrutiny”).93 By contrast, rights that are not
fundamental, such as economic and social rights, may be abridged by a law that is
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest” (“rational basis”).94
Lower courts recognize that being provided care in the least restrictive form
of intervention is a right. This right was a major tool for moving institutionalized
patients out of state hospitals and into a community setting in the 1970s.95 As
supported in a number of lower federal court decisions, the existence of the right
rests on the argument that the state cannot deprive people of liberty to an extent
unwarranted to meet its legitimate goals;96 though the state has the power to commit
people with mental disabilities to inpatient treatment, it cannot do so when means
“less restrictive of liberty [are] available to accomplish the same ends.”97
However, the Supreme Court has yet to find the right to the least restrictive
form of intervention in the fundamental right to liberty. First, in Pennhurst State
87. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 583 (1999); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
88. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
89. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
90. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (recognizing the fundamental due process right to
marriage).
91. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (discussing the parental right to control
a child’s education).
92. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (O’Connor, J.
concurring) (discussing well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity).
93. Id.
94. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
95. Paul S. Appelbaum, Least Restrictive Alternative Revisited: Olmstead’s Uncertain Mandate for
Community-Based Care, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1271, 1271 (Oct. 1999).
96. See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that “deprivations of
liberty solely because of dangers to ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for
their protection”).
97. Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 1271.
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School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Court declined to find that the bill of rights
provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act created
any substantive right for people with I/DD to receive “appropriate treatment” in the
“least restrictive” environment.98 Then, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court declined
to extend the rights to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint to a
broad right to the “minimally adequate care and treatment that appropriately may be
required” for an individual, instead holding that people with I/DD only have a right
to “minimally adequate or reasonable [treatment] to ensure [their] safety and freedom
from undue restraint.”99 Finally, in Olmstead v. L.C., the Court found that Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act100 requires states to place people with mental
disabilities in community settings rather than institutions “when the [s]tate’s
treatment professionals determine community placement is appropriate.”101
However, again the Court declined to extend this right to a broad substantive due
process right to the least restrictive form of intervention.102
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to find a substantive right to the least
restrictive form of intervention limits the ability of people with I/DD placed in
guardianships to challenge the statutory scheme which has restricted their rights.
Under New Mexico’s guardianship statute, a person petitioning the court for an
individual with I/DD to be placed in a guardianship has the burden of informing the
judge of lesser-restrictive alternatives and why they are not appropriate for the case
at hand.103 Despite this burden on the petitioner, courts incorrectly place people with
I/DD in guardianships because of judicial failure to accurately consider the right of
people to make decisions in the least restrictive setting as a fundamental right.
Because of this, the statute is accorded a strong presumption of validity under
rational basis review.104
A statute fails rational basis only when it “rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s [legitimate] objective.”105 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that providing care, treatment, and other services to
people with I/DD is a legitimate state interest.106 While the Court has not addressed
whether this interest in providing services is met by providing guardianships, the
Court has determined that the interest can be met by serving individuals in
institutional settings107 —an even more restrictive means of controlling people with
I/DD than guardianships. Thus, it is highly likely that the Court would find that the

98. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981).
99. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
100. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability in public services furnished by
governmental entities and public accommodations provided by private entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65.
101. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999).
102. See id. at 608 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (stating that states do not have an affirmative duty
to provide care in the least restrictive setting when the system for that lesser restrictive care does not exist).
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(B)(4)(b) (2021).
104. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
105. Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. E.g., Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 12 (1981).
107. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (holding that due process requires proof more
substantial than preponderance of the evidence when the state exercises its interest in providing care to
citizens who cannot care for themselves by civil commitment).
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state’s interest is also rationally met by placing people with I/DD in guardianships,
even if there are lesser restrictive options available. Whether a state could have
chosen a less rights-restrictive means for achieving its state interest is irrelevant to
rational basis review.108 Therefore, a challenge to New Mexico’s guardianship
statute based on a substantive due process violation of the right to the least restrictive
form of intervention would be unlikely to prevail at the federal level. Though the
Court has never outright denied the substantive right to the least restrictive means of
intervention, it is unlikely this trajectory of disinclination to find a right will change
course. However, a constitutional challenge to guardianship may succeed at the state
level, as considered below.
2.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o
[s]tate shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”109 To determine if a law violates federal constitutional equal protections, a
court must first determine if there is a discriminatory classification. A law can be
facially discriminatory110 or facially neutral but applied in a discriminatory
manner.111 If the law is neutral on its face, but has a disproportionate impact on a
particular group, there must be a showing of discriminatory purpose for courts to
apply heightened scrutiny.112 If there is a discriminatory classification, the court then
determines what level of judicial scrutiny applies and analyzes if the challenged
legislation is unconstitutionally discriminatory under that standard of review. The
United States Supreme Court has created three standards of judicial scrutiny for
reviewing equal protection claims: strict scrutiny,113 used for discrimination based
on a suspect classification;114 intermediate scrutiny,115 used for discrimination based

108. Heller, 509 U.S. at 330.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
110. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (challenging laws requiring or permitting
segregation according to race).
111. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (challenging police recruitment
procedures that disproportionately excluded Black people from being recruited).
112. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 273–74 (1886) (holding the contested law violated
equal protection as applied, although neutral on its face because it was applied so invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of race).
113. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (stating to overcome strict scrutiny, the
action must be “necessary to further a compelling governmental interest . . . [and] narrowly tailored to
further that interest”).
114. Suspect classifications are based on race, national origin, religion, and alienage. See generally
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussing race); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (discussing national origin/alienage).
115. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating to overcome intermediate scrutiny,
the law must further an “important governmental objective[] and must be substantially related to the
achievement of [that objective]”).
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on quasi-suspect classifications;116 and rational review,117 used for other
discriminatory classifications. Finally, a court determines whether the discriminatory
classification satisfies the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has held that laws discriminating against people with
developmental disabilities are afforded rational basis, and thus must be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose.118 In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, the Court declined to find that I/DD119 is a suspect or quasi-suspect class
calling for a higher standard of judicial review.120 The Court reasoned that distinct
legislative responses at the state and federal level to the problems facing people with
I/DD reflect “the real and undeniable differences between the [developmentally
disabled] and others” and the need for governments to have flexibility in shaping
their remedial efforts.121 Because people with I/DD have a “reduced ability to cope
with and function in the everyday world,” they are inherently different from other
persons.122 Further, “how this large and diversified group is to be treated under the
law is a difficult and often technical matter” better left to be addressed by legislators
“guided by qualified professionals,” rather than the “ill-informed opinions of the
judiciary.”123 Additionally, the Court dismissed the claim that people with I/DD are
politically powerless as “the legislative response [to the plight of those with
I/DD] . . . could hardly have occurred and survived without public support . . .
negat[ing] any claim that [people with I/DD] are politically powerless in the sense
that they have no ability to attract the attention of lawmakers.”124 Finally, the Court
emphasized its reluctance to identify people with I/DD a quasi-suspect class because
“it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups
who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others . . . who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.”125 In sum,
“[b]ecause [developmental disability] is a characteristic that the government may
legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions . . . [the Court] will not
presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages [people with
developmental disabilities], is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not

116. Gender and illegitimacy are considered quasi-suspect classes. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977) (holding that illegitimacy received intermediate scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(holding gender is a quasi-suspect class).
117. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (stating a legislative
classification must be sustained if the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate government
interest”).
118. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
119. The Court uses derogatory terms to reference people with I/DD. See, e.g., id. These references
have been changed to reflect changing social attitudes and to respect the individuals who are being
considered. See generally Robert L. Schalock, Ruth A. Luckasson & Karrie A. Shogren, The Renaming
of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELLECTUAL
& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116 (2007).
120. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
121. Id. at 444.
122. Id. at 442.
123. Id. at 442–43.
124. Id. at 445.
125. Id.
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tolerate.”126 Thus, the Court declined to provide people with I/DD a higher level
constitutional protection when challenging discriminatory statutory schemes.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize people with I/DD as a class that
requires heightened scrutiny means that a constitutional challenge to New Mexico’s
state guardianship law must show the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. In Cleburne, the Court determined that a city ordinance
requiring a special permit for homes for people with I/DD was not rationally related
to the government’s legitimate interests in addressing the safety and fears of residents
in the adjoining neighborhood and public safety concerns regarding the number of
people to be housed in the home.127 The Court considered both the evidentiary record
that showed an irrational prejudice against people with I/DD as the reason for the
city ordinance and the underinclusive nature of the ordinance as it did not require a
special permit for other forms of “group” housing, such as sororities and hospitals.128
However, New Mexico’s guardianship statute is different from the city
ordinance in Cleburne: 1) it does not “single out” people with I/DD, it covers all
“incapacitated persons,” and 2) the history of the statute indicates its purpose is to
protect people with I/DD from abuse and to provide a method of support, rather than
to discriminate.129 Providing care, treatment, and other services to people with I/DD
are legitimate state interests.130 Further, New Mexico’s guardianship statute is
rationally related to this goal, as the statute provides decision-making supports for
people with I/DD. Thus, the statute is “rationally related” to a legitimate
governmental interest and would likely be upheld if challenged on federal equal
protection grounds.131
B.

New Mexico’s Greater Protections for People with I/DD

Even though relief is likely not available for individuals with I/DD
challenging New Mexico’s guardianship statute on federal constitutional grounds,
there are alternative options. The New Mexico Constitution may provide greater
protections than its federal counterpart.132 When examining a state constitutional
126. Id. at 446. Though beyond the scope of this comment, scholars have debated whether Cleburne
was wrongly decided, and people with developmental disabilities should have been declared a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63(3) EMORY L. J.
527 (2014).
127. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
128. Id. at 450.
129. See Editorial: New Guardianship Law Adds Oversight, Favors Alternatives, supra note 54.
130. E.g., Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 12 (1981).
131. Though beyond the scope of this comment, it is possible state guardianship laws could face
constitutional challenges in other ways. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court determined that Congress could
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under the 14th Amendment, Section 5 by passing a statute that
provided a remedy for discrimination based on disability and enforcement of the right of access to the
courts. 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). This “hybrid analysis,” considering a discriminatory classification in
conjunction with a fundamental right, could perhaps be used to challenge state guardianship statutes under
federal constitutional protections.
132. State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 10, 140 N.M. 345, 142 P.3d 933; see also Linda M. Vanzi,
Andrew G. Schultz & Melanie B. Stambaugh, State Constitutional Litigation in New Mexico: All Shield
and No Sword, 48(2) N.M. L. REV. 302, 305 (2018) (discussing greater constitutional protections in New
Mexico found by the state courts).
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issue, New Mexico courts follow the three-step interstitial approach.133 Under the
interstitial approach, the court asks first “whether the right being asserted is protected
under the federal constitution.”134 Second, if the right being asserted is protected,
then the state constitutional claim is not reached and the analysis ends; if the right
being asserted is not protected, then the state constitution is examined.135 Third, the
court may diverge from federal precedent and identify a right that is not recognized
at the federal level when existing federal precedent is flawed,136 when there are
structural differences between the state and federal government,137 or when there are
distinctive state characteristics.138
In this section, I will first discuss how the due process protections of the
state constitution are more expansive than the protections under the federal
constitution due to distinct state characteristics. Therefore, New Mexico courts
should find a right to the least restrictive form of intervention and that state
guardianship laws violate that right for people with I/DD. Second, I will address how
independent analysis of the state’s equal protection clause leads to the application of
a higher level of constitutional scrutiny for people with I/DD than a federal court
would use in analogous situations. Under this higher level of scrutiny, the state
guardianship scheme violates the equal protection rights of people with I/DD.
1.
i.

Due Process
Fundamental Right to the Least Restrictive Form of Intervention

Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution requires “due process
of law” when a state deprives any person of “life, liberty, or property.”139 Like at the
federal level, “due process of law includes both procedural due process and
substantive due process.”140 There are three levels of judicial scrutiny for New
Mexico Constitutional due process analysis: rational basis,141 intermediate

133. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012, ¶ 10, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (“[W]e must
decline to adopt the blanket federal rule that all warrantless arrests of felons based on probable cause are
constitutionally permissible in public places. . . . [W]e believe that each case must be reviewed in light of
its own facts and circumstances.”).
137. See, e.g., State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011, ¶ 24, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (holding New
Mexico Constitution embodies a knock-and-announce requirement for entry to execute warrant—federal
constitution only later interpreted similarly in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)).
138. See, e.g., State v. Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083, ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (concluding that
New Mexico has not experienced rigidity and technicalities leading to federal abandonment of two-part
test of informer’s veracity and basis of knowledge as probable cause to issue warrant).
139. N.M. CONST. art II, § 18.
140. Martinez v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n of N.M., 2012-NMCA-096, ¶ 37, 286 P.3d 613.
141. See, e.g., ACLU of N.M. v. Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, ¶ 19, 139 N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215.
If the legislation does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification, nor impinge upon
an important individual interest, rational basis review applies. Under rational basis review, the burden is
on the challenger to show that the statute has no rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
Id.
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scrutiny,142 and strict scrutiny.143 The appropriate level of judicial scrutiny is based
on the “nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the
classifications created by the statute.”144 New Mexico courts use the same standards
of review to analyze both due process and equal protection.145 In examining the
constitutionality of a statute for substantive due process, courts first analyze whether
the statute implicates a fundamental or important right.146 Based on that
determination, the court establishes which level of judicial scrutiny is warranted and
applies it to the statute.147
Although New Mexico courts have not departed from federal case law in
the interpretation of the due process clause of Section 18 in finding fundamental
rights, the New Mexico Supreme Court has hinted that Article II, Section 4, of the
state constitution might be a conduit through which New Mexicans might be entitled
to greater due process protections.148 Article II, Section 4, of the New Mexico
Constitution (“Inherent Rights Clause”) guarantees that “all persons . . . have certain
natural, inherent, and inalienable rights” entitled to protection, including the
enjoyment of “life and liberty.”149 There is no analogous provision in the United
States Constitution to the Inherent Rights Clause. New Mexico courts have stated
that the Inherent Rights Clause offers “more expansive” protections than those
offered by the United States Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection
guarantees.150 Although the exact delineation of the scope of this “more expansive”
protection remains elusive, the New Mexico Supreme Court has suggested that the
provision “may . . . ultimately be a source of greater due process protections than
those provided under federal law.”151 However, the court has never held the Inherent
Rights Clause to be the sole source of either a fundamental or important
constitutional right.152
New Mexico courts should recognize the right to the least restrictive form
of intervention under New Mexico’s due process and inherent rights protections of
liberty interests. Under the interstitial approach, a state constitutional question is not

142. See, e.g., id. Intermediate scrutiny applies when legislative classifications infringe on important,
but not fundamental, rights. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must show the scheme is
“substantially related to an important governmental interest.” Id.
143. See, e.g., id. Strict scrutiny is appropriate when “the violated interest is a fundamental personal
right or civil liberty guaranteed by the constitution.” Id. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government
must show there is a “compelling state interest supporting the challenged scheme, and [] show that the
statute accomplishes its purpose by the least restrictive means.” Id.
144. Martinez, 2012-NMCA-096, ¶ 37, 286 P.3d 613.
145. Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep’t, 1994-NMSC-116, ¶ 9, 118 N.M. 753, 887 P.2d
747.
146. State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 52, 135 N.M. 223, 86 P.3d 1050.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 51, 376 P.3d 836.
149. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4.
150. Cal. First Bank v. State, 1990-NMSC-106, ¶ 44, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646.
151. Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 51, 376 P.3d 836; see also Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA100, ¶ 113, 356 P.3d 564 (Vanzi, J., dissenting) (“I think it is plain that Section 4 supplements and expands
the liberty rights afforded by Section 18’s due process clause to ensure maximum protection for the lives
and liberty of New Mexicans.”).
152. Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 51, 376 P.3d 836.
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reached if the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution. The
right to the least restrictive form of intervention is not protected under the federal
constitution,153 and state courts should diverge from this precedent due to distinctive
state characteristics.
The New Mexico Supreme Court was most recently asked to expand the
fundamental liberty rights of New Mexicans in Morris v. Brandenburg. In Morris,
the court declined to find that there is a fundamental right to physician aid-in-dying
under New Mexico’s constitutional due process provision.154 The court refused to
depart from federal precedent based on flawed federal reasoning, finding that the
federal analysis set forth in the Supreme Court case, Washington v. Glucksberg,
which addressed the same constitutional question, was not flawed.155 Petitioners
asserted that Glucksberg was flawed because the Glucksberg approach to substantive
due process claims has since been abandoned and because Glucksberg reviewed a
facial challenge that “did not have the evidence we have today [demonstrating] the
safety of aid in dying.”156 The court dismissed the idea that the Glucksberg approach
of defining rights in relation to historical practices had been abandoned, finding
instead that Glucksberg addressed a unique issue that was more difficult to define
than other interests that had come before the Supreme Court, such as marriage.157
Further, the court agreed with the Glucksberg Court’s analysis concerning legitimate
government interests, finding that legitimate government interests exist which would
be abrogated by finding physician aid-in-dying a fundamental right.158
Additionally, the court did not find any distinctive state characteristics that
would justify departure from federal precedent.159 The court found that New
Mexico’s historical reverence for patient autonomy and dignity in end-of-life
decision-making, as evidenced in multiple state statutes, explicitly did not extend to
physician aid-in-dying.160 The court also disagreed with the assertion that a
terminally ill patient’s decision to seek physician aid-in-dying is rooted in already
recognized fundamental rights. Instead, the court found that state judicial precedent
limited these existing rights and prevented an expanded right that may protect
physician aid-in-dying.161 Therefore, the court followed Glucksberg and found that
New Mexicans do not have a fundamental right to physician aid-in-dying.
Unlike the right at issue in Morris, which was addressed federally in
Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court has never specifically answered the question of
whether there is a fundamental right to the least restrictive form of intervention or
support in the provision of care and services for people with mental illness and I/DD.
Instead, the Court narrowly tailors a person’s interest in the least restrictive
intervention to existing fundamental rights, such as liberty and freedom from
153.
(1981).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See supra Part III.A.1; see also Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18
Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 38, 376 P.3d 836.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 38.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 38.
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physical restraint.162 Thus, New Mexico courts could not depart from federal
precedent here based on flawed federal analysis.
However, New Mexico does have distinct state characteristics, including a
historical respect for the right of people to receive the least restrictive form of support
as evidenced in case law and statute, that courts could rely on to find a fundamental
right to the least restrictive means of intervention under the New Mexico
Constitution. Unlike in Morris, where the court found that the state’s historical
respect for patient autonomy explicitly excluded the right to physician aid-in-dying,
the state’s respect for the right to the least restrictive form of intervention is not
exclusionary. Moreover, the Inherent Rights Clause of the state constitution is a
unique provision that provides the basis for the courts to find more expansive liberty
rights than those under federal precedent. New Mexico’s historical respect for the
right to the least restrictive means of intervention and distinct provisions of the state
constitution are sufficient evidence that the courts should recognize it as a
fundamental right for purposes of due process analysis.
New Mexico has numerous statutes that emphasize the states’ reverence for
the right to the least restrictive form of intervention. First, New Mexico was one of
the first states to define the “least restrictive alternative” doctrine for purposes of
involuntary commitment.163 Second, in an instruction to a 2021 statutory
implementation working group of guardianship stakeholders, the group members
were to “identify the least restrictive decision-making options for alleged
incapacitated persons . . . “164—an explicit recognition to the right in the
guardianship context. Third, the state guardianship statute directs guardians to
“exercise supervisory powers over the protected person in a manner that is the least
restrictive form of intervention consistent with the order of the court.”165 Regardless
of the misguided application of this provision,166 the statute recognizes the interest
of people placed in a guardianship and their right to be subject to the least-restrictive
form of intervention. Fourth, the administrative code states that any emergency
intervention “shall be the least restrictive intervention necessary to meet the
emergency” when limiting a person with developmental disabilities’ rights in an
effort to prevent physical harm.167 Most notably, the Children’s Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code recognizes the “right to individualized treatment
or habilitation services,” including the “right to prompt treatment and habilitation
162. See supra Part III.A.1.
163. Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 27, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1-3(D)(1) (2021) (enacted in 1977, defines “the least drastic means principle” as the
“habilitation or treatment and the conditions of habilitation or treatment for the client . . . that are no more
harsh, hazardous or intrusive than necessary to achieve acceptable treatment objectives for the client”).
But see State v. Sanchez, 1969-NMSC-090, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (holding that due process did not
require the state to consider less restrictive alternatives to total institutionalization). New Mexico’s civil
commitment statute, the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, N.M. STAT. ANN. sections
43-1-2 to -25 (2021), was primarily authored by University of New Mexico School of Law Professor
James W. Ellis, who strongly advocated for legislation that encompassed the least restrictive means
doctrine.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-18(B) (2021).
165. Id. § 45-5-312(A) (2021).
166. See supra Part II.A.
167. N.M. CODE R. § 7.26.3.11 (2021).
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pursuant to an individualized treatment plan and consistent with the least restrictive
means principle.”168 As the right to the least restrictive form of intervention is
statutorily recognized for juveniles, and the right for adults is not statutorily
precluded, New Mexico courts could find that the right to the least restrictive form
of intervention extends to everyone.
Further, the right to the least restrictive form of intervention is found in New
Mexico case law within the context of civil commitment. In Garcia v. Las Vegas
Medical Center, the court found that New Mexicans have a substantive due process
right to be free from civil commitment unless the proposed commitment is
“consistent with the client’s treatment needs and the least drastic means principle.”169
In LaBalbo v. Hymes, the court reaffirmed this idea, stating that the substantive
liberty interest in maintaining treatment services can be found in plain, statutory
language indicating a “right to appropriate habilitation services . . . consistent with
the least drastic means principle. . . . “170
Moreover, the Inherent Rights Clause provides distinct additions to the
rights afforded by the federal Constitution and is a basis to diverge from federal
precedent. The framers of the state Constitution enumerated certain “inherent” rights,
including the rights of people “to ‘enjoy[] and defend[]’ their own ‘li[ves] and
liberty’ against unjustified intrusions by the government.”171 The section is not
“ornamental,” but is important in considering the liberty rights of New Mexicans.172
In Morris, the court declined to find a right to physician aid-in-dying under the
Inherent Rights Clause, reasoning that physician-assisted suicide runs directly
contrary to the state’s interest in preserving life and the individual right to life.173 In
contrast, New Mexicans certainly have a liberty interest in being free from
unwarranted forms of restriction under the guise of treatment or support.
Fundamental liberty interests have been traditionally extended to, among other
things, the right of “bodily integrity,” which has been broadly described as a
“freedom to care for one’s health and person[.]”174 Substantive due process protects
the individual “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”175 The interest in self-definition, which is “at the heart of liberty,” is no
less than “the right to define one’s own concept of existence.”176 Certainly, the right
of people with I/DD to “define one’s own concept of existence” is closely related to
the right to the least restrictive form of intervention.177 Between the Inherent Rights

168. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-6A-7(A) (2021).
169. Garcia v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 1991-NMCA-053, ¶ 20, 112 N.M. 441, 816 P.2d 510.
170. LaBalbo v. Hymes, 1993-NMCA-010, ¶ 14 n.2, 115 N.M. 314, 850 P.2d 1017.
171. N.M. CONST. art II, § 4.
172. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 112, 356 P.3d 564 (Vanzi, J., dissenting); see also
Marshall J. Ray, What Does the Natural Rights Clause Mean to New Mexico, 39 N.M. L. REV. 375 (2009).
173. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 30, 376 P.3d 836.
174. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
175. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (footnote omitted).
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
177. But see in re B.B., 516 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1994) (declining to find a right to the least restrictive
form of intervention, regardless of the availability of a less restrictive placement). However, Iowa, unlike
New Mexico, does not have a “Inherent Rights Clause” or similar provision that lacks an analogous federal
provision.
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Clause’s extended protections of individual liberty, and the state’s recognition of the
importance of receiving supports or intervention in the least restrictive manner, the
courts should find that New Mexicans have a fundamental right to the least restrictive
form of intervention.
Finally, in the New Mexico Court of Appeal’s decision on Morris, the court
declined to find a fundamental right to aid-in-dying in part because recognition of
the right would be an act of “selective discrimination” as only a “select few” would
have it.178 A similar argument could be used to refute the recognition of the right to
the least restrictive form of intervention. However, this contention is flawed—the
right to the least restrictive form of intervention belongs to all New Mexicans. The
fact that the right “may be invoked only by some people who find themselves in
certain circumstances is also true of other constitutional rights.”179 Though the right
to the least restrictive form of supports or intervention may only be exercised by
some people, it belongs to all New Mexicans and all New Mexicans could benefit
from it.
New Mexico’s distinctive state characteristics, including the unique
language of the inherent rights clause and the recognition of the right to the least
restrictive form of intervention in state case law and statute, mean the state courts
should depart from federal precedent and recognize the right to the least restrictive
form of support.
ii.

Guardianship Violates the Right to the Least Restrictive Form of
Intervention

New Mexico’s guardianship statute infringes on the fundamental right of
people with I/DD to the least restrictive means of support. As it exists now, New
Mexicans with I/DD are subject to having their ability to control their finances, living
situation, and personal life removed, even though a less drastic form of intervention
may be appropriate for the individual. While a petitioner for a guardianship has the
burden to inform the court of available lesser-restrictive forms of intervention and
establishing why they are inappropriate in that particular guardianship case, judges
fail to take these potentially lesser-restrictive options into account and improperly
impose guardianships.180 If state courts recognized the fundamental right to the least
restrictive form of support for people with I/DD, the following analysis shows the
current scheme of guardianship would violate state constitutional protection of
fundamental rights.
When a fundamental due process right is implicated, courts apply strict
scrutiny to determine if a statute violates that right.181 Under strict scrutiny analysis,
the government must show there is a compelling state interest supporting the
challenged scheme and that the statute accomplishes its purpose by the least

178. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 44–47, 356 P.3d 564.
179. Id. ¶ 73 (Vanzi, J., dissenting). For example, the parental autonomy rights recognized by the
Constitution apply to all citizens, though not all citizens will have children. Reproductive autonomy rights
to use contraception belong to everyone, even though not everyone will be in situations to exercise those
rights. Id.
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. ACLU of N.M. v. Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, ¶ 19, 139 N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215.
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restrictive means.182 In the case of guardianship, the state has an important, if not
compelling, interest in providing supports and services for people with I/DD.
However, guardianship is not the least restrictive means of achieving this interest.
For example, the state could statutorily recognize and promote less drastic means of
decision-making supports, such as supported decision-making, as the default method
of removing people’s ability to make their own decisions.183
Even though there is a statutory preference for limited guardianships in New
Mexico, which theoretically does not violate the right to the least restrictive form of
intervention, limited guardianships are overused and unwarrantably imposed on
individuals for whom a less restrictive method would be appropriate.184 This
statutory preference therefore is not the “least restrictive means” of achieving the
state’s compelling interest in providing supports and services to people with I/DD
for purposes of strict scrutiny analysis. If New Mexico courts recognized the
substantive due process right to the least restrictive means of intervention, the state
guardianship statute and its implementation would not withstand strict scrutiny.
2.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution states that
“no person shall be . . . denied equal protection of the laws.”185 The New Mexico
Equal Protection Clause affords “rights and protections” independent of the United
States Constitution.186 New Mexico courts use a three-step analysis to determine if a
petitioner’s equal protection rights have been violated. First, petitioners must prove
they are “similarly situated to another group but are treated dissimilarly” because of
a legislative classification.187 Second, if petitioners are similarly situated, then the
court determines what level of scrutiny should be applied to the legislation they are
challenging.188 Courts apply one of three levels of judicial scrutiny based on the
“nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the classifications
created by the statute.”189 The same standards of review are used in analyzing both
due process and equal protection.190 Finally, the court determines if the challenged
legislation is constitutional under equal protection analysis using the appropriate
level of judicial scrutiny.191
182. Id. This reference to the “least restrictive means” is not to be confused with the “least restrictive
means of intervention” doctrine. See supra Part II.
183. See infra Part IV.A. The implementation of supported decision-making would mean the burden
would be on petitioners for a guardianship to prove (with a to-be-determined evidentiary standard) that
the alleged incapacitated person’s needs would not be met with a lesser restrictive means of decisionmaking restraints. As it is now, courts can impose limited guardianships with the acknowledgement that
there are lesser restrictive means available, but judges often rely on discriminatory assumptions to dismiss
the actual capacity of the alleged incapacitated person. See supra Part II.A.
184. See supra Part II.A.
185. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
186. Chapman v. Luna, 1985-NMSC-056, 102 N.M. 768, 701 P.2d 367.
187. Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 8, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413.
188. Id.
189. Martinez v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n of N.M., 2012-NMCA-096, ¶ 37, 286 P.3d 613.
190. Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep’t, 1994-NMSC-116, ¶ 9, 118 N.M. 753, 887 P.2d
747.
191. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 413.
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Similarly Situated Analysis

The threshold question in analyzing all equal protection challenges is
whether the legislation creates a class of similarly situated individuals who are
treated dissimilarly.192 In Wagner v. AGW Consultants, the court was presented with
the question of whether a fee limitation on attorney’s fees distinguished between
similarly situated individuals.193 Though the law in question was neutral on its face,
as applied, it created two classes of worker’s compensation litigants: “those who do
and do not reach the limitation at the administrative stage, and consequently those
who can and cannot lawfully pay an attorney a reasonable fee on appeal.”194 The
court emphasized the disparate impact this has on the two classes of worker’s
compensation litigants. For workers’ attorneys, if the fee cap is met at the
administrative level, they will not be paid on appeal, and thus most likely will not
continue to represent the worker. 195 Meanwhile, a fee cap likely does not have the
same effect on employers’ attorneys as they are paid if they win or lose, and not
subject to the judicial approval or fees.196 Thus, the court determined that the law in
question did create two classes of similarly situated litigants.
Similarly, New Mexico’s guardianship statute creates a classification of
similarly situated individuals, even though the law is neutral on its face. Section 455-301.1 provides that guardianship is available for an “incapacitated person.”197 An
incapacitated person is anyone “who demonstrates over time either partial or
complete functional impairment by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency,
physical illness or disability,” or any other cause (except minority) to the extent that
the person is unable to manage their personal affairs.198 The facial classification is
between persons who are “inherently different”—individuals who are impaired and
individuals who are not. However, in practice, the statute dissimilarly impacts people
within the “incapacitated” class, specifically people with I/DD.199 It is “erroneous to
rely on the notion that a classification based on a unique physical characteristic is
reasonable simply because it corresponds to some ‘natural’ grouping.”200 For elders,
loss of capacity typically increases over time and rarely improves.201 In contrast, for
individuals with I/DD, capacity may improve with age and experience; for some,
capacity is cyclical.202 Moreover, for people with I/DD, stereotypes often foster the

192. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, ¶ 35, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250.
193. Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 22, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050.
194. Id. ¶ 23; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 273–74 (1886) (holding the contested law
violated equal protection as applied, although neutral on its face).
195. Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 57, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050 (Bosson, C.J., concurring in part).
196. Id. ¶ 57 (Bosson, C.J., concurring in part).
197. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (2021).
198. Id. § 45-5-101(F) (2021).
199. Consideration of others within the “incapacitated” class who are treated dissimilarly, such as the
elderly, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
200. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 39, 126 N.M. 788, 975 P.2d 841
(quoting Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341,
346 (1949)).
201. Pinnes & Jackson, supra note 78.
202. Id.
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presumption of incapacity.203 As a result of these differences, classes of individuals
within the designation of “incapacitation” may experience disparate effects of
guardianship. While guardianship may be appropriate for many who are
“incapacitated,” for people with I/DD whose capacity has improved over time, or
who are designated “incapacitated” due to stereotypes, decision-making restraints
are unwarrantably placed on them via guardianship. Therefore, there is a
classification of similarly situated persons with disparate outcomes in the case of
guardianship, meeting the first element of the Equal Protection Clause.
ii.

I/DD as a Sensitive Class

The second step in analyzing an equal protection claim in New Mexico is
to determine if the class of individuals being discriminated against is a sensitive or
suspect class that requires more rigorous review by the court.204 Only legislation that
“affects the exercise of a fundamental right or a suspect classification such as race or
ancestry” is subject to strict scrutiny.205 Legislation can trigger intermediate scrutiny
review when it either restricts the ability to exercise an important right, or treats the
person challenging the constitutionality of the legislation differently because they
belong to a sensitive class.206 In New Mexico, courts have applied intermediate
scrutiny to classifications based on I/DD because such discrimination is based on a
sensitive classification.207
In Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, the New Mexico Supreme Court
determined that individuals with I/DD belong to a sensitive class as defined by equal
protection jurisprudence.208 A group of people qualifies as a sensitive class justifying
intermediate scrutiny when they have been “subjected to a history of discrimination
and political powerlessness based on a characteristic or characteristics that are
relatively beyond the individuals’ control such that the discrimination warrants a
degree of protection from the majoritarian political processes.”209 The court noted
that people with “mental disabilities” have suffered historical societal and political
exclusion based on a characteristic out of their control, including segregation, forced
institutionalization, and exclusion from citizenship.210 Even among the broader
disability community, the court reasoned that forms of I/DD are the “most negatively
perceived of all disabilities,” leading to greater and more grotesque examples of
discrimination.211 Further, it considered Congress and the New Mexico Legislature’s
enactment of laws that ensure better living standards for individuals with I/DD,
indicating a continuing need for this group be protected from societal
discrimination.212 By defining people with I/DD as a suspect class, the New Mexico
203. Id.
204. Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 12, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413.
205. Id. ¶ 11.
206. Id. ¶ 13.
207. See generally id.
208. Id. ¶ 17.
209. Id. ¶ 21.
210. Id. ¶ 22.
211. Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 20 (1993–94)).
212. Id. ¶ 25.
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Supreme Court determined it is appropriate to apply intermediate scrutiny to
classifications based on mental disability.213
iii.

New Mexico’s Guardianship Scheme Violates Equal Protection

The final step in equal protection analysis is to apply the appropriate level
of judicial scrutiny to the challenged legislation.214 As considered above, legislative
classifications based on I/DD are subject to intermediate scrutiny. When courts apply
intermediate scrutiny to legislation challenged under equal protection in New
Mexico, the courts will uphold the legislation if the classification is “substantially
related to an important government interest.”215 When applying intermediate
scrutiny, the courts must examine the governmental interests served by the legislative
classification, and whether the classifications under the statute bear a substantial
relationship to any such important interests.216 In determining whether there is a
substantial relationship, the court employs a “least restrictive alternative analysis,”
under which “the least restrictive alternative need not be selected if it poses serious
practical difficulties in implementation, [but] the existence of less restrictive
alternatives is material to the determination of whether the classification
substantially furthers an important governmental interest.”217 The party supporting
the constitutionality of the legislation must show that the discriminatory
classification is based on “reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical
application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.”218 Finally, courts balance
the importance of the governmental interest against the burdens imposed on the
individual and on society.219
In Breen, the court considered whether different treatment under the New
Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act between those that suffered physical disability
and those that suffered mental disability violated equal protection.220 Under the
statute, mental disability compensation was limited to 100 weeks, while
compensation for physical disability could be granted for a lifetime.221 The
respondents argued that the governmental interest in treating workers with I/DD
differently was to protect the financial viability of Worker’s Compensation and to
prevent fraudulent claims of mental disability, as claims of mental disabilities are
harder to diagnose and “are more susceptible to fraudulent claims.”222 While the
court allowed that keeping Worker’s Compensation financially sound was an

213. Id. ¶ 28.
214. Id. ¶ 8.
215. See, e.g., Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep’t, 1994-NMSC-116, ¶ 9, 118 N.M. 753,
887 P.2d 747.
216. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 30, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413.
217. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1990-NMSC-083, ¶ 25, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305).
218. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 30, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982)).
219. Id. ¶ 31.
220. Id. ¶ 33.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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important governmental interest, it determined that the discriminatory classification
was not substantially related to that interest.223 First, the court stated that the purpose
of the Worker’s Compensation Act is to prevent workers from “becoming a public
charge and to assist the worker in returning to work with minimal dependence on
compensation awards.”224 Second, the court noted that the Act is the only available
remedy for workplace accidents, with no other means of remedy, meaning that
mentally disabled workers are burdened with severely less time to transition into a
job that is not compromised by their disability.225 Third, in addressing the claim that
the classification is intended to prevent potential fraud, the court identifies several
other existing mechanisms to prevent fraud, which are all valid and less restrictive
than arbitrarily limiting the amount of compensation of people with mental
disabilities.226 When balancing this arbitrary limit against the severe burden it places
on workers with mental disabilities, the court found that the disparity in
compensation was not substantially related to the important government interests
alleged and thus violated equal protection.227
Similarly, intermediate scrutiny applies in the case of guardianship as the
dissimilar treatment at issue is of people with I/DD. The New Mexico Guardians of
Incapacitated statute provides for the implementation of a guardianship for
individuals the court deems incapacitated.228 The disparity alleged is that this law
permits the removal of decision-making abilities from individuals who are deemed
incapacitated, which disparately impacts people with I/DD, whose decision-making
capacity changes over time, leaving them impermissibly restricted within a
guardianship. There are certainly important government interests in providing
guardianships for people with I/DD who need support, including providing support
for people with limited capacity, preventing abuse and exploitation, and ensuring
that people are able to sufficiently care for themselves for both individual and public
health. However, the implementation of guardianship is not “substantially related”
to these government interests.
First, while the existence of lesser restrictive alternatives is not dispositive
for purposes of intermediate scrutiny, the availability of less restrictive means is
material to determine whether the discriminatory classification furthers an important
government interest. Here, there are certainly lesser restrictive alternatives to
guardianship that would further the government’s important interest in providing
support for people with I/DD and promoting individual and public health, including
supported decision-making agreements, powers of attorney, and authorized
representatives.229
Second, the discriminatory classification is, at least in part, based on
stereotyping. Stereotypes promulgated by the courts can land people with I/DD in
223. Id. ¶ 35.
224. Id. ¶ 36 (quoting Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, ¶ 12, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d
250).
225. Id. ¶ 38–39.
226. Id. ¶ 40–44.
227. Id. ¶ 48.
228. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (2021).
229. See infra Part IV.A; Alternatives to Guardianship, DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS COLORADO
(June 24, 2021), https://www.dpcolo.org/alternatives-to-guardianship/.
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guardianships, even if their level of capacity would be better supported with a
different form of intervention.230 For example, some practitioners have argued that
judges “don’t know enough about the [disability] themselves to understand that, even
if someone . . . can’t even speak . . . [they] still may be able to make decisions for
themselves so long as they can get the support that they need.”231 Additionally,
though medical professionals may base their determinations of capacity on the
individuals ability, or inability, to complete basic activities of daily living, this
evidence is used to support the need for guardianship, even though a person who
needs supports in daily living may still be able to make their own decisions.232
Third, the burden imposed on the individual who is subject to guardianship
is high. Someone with I/DD who is placed in a guardianship not only has their right
to the least restrictive means of intervention limited,233 but also faces difficulty to
getting out of a guardianship once one is in place. Compared to other states, New
Mexico has a relatively permissible process for protected persons to restore their
rights. The state permits an informal request for restoration of an “incapacitated”
person’s rights, such as an informal letter.234 Additionally, the statute broadly permits
any interested party to petition for restoration.235 Following receipt of a request for
review, the court will hold a status hearing to determine the appropriate order to be
entered.236 Usually, courts rely on medical examinations and in-court observations
of the individual to determine whether the protected person has regained capacity.237
However, studies indicate that petitions for restoration are uncommon.238 This may
be because of an individual’s lack of awareness of their right to pursue restoration or
lack of ability to obtain sufficient evidence to satisfy the petitioner’s burden to show
the need for guardianship has ended.239 Also, courts can be reluctant to revisit
guardianships in a bid to conserve judicial resources and preserve the finality of court
orders.240 This means that people with I/DD can be stuck in a guardianship that was
discriminatorily and improperly put in place.

230. See supra Part II.A.
231. BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 146; see also John Pollock & Megan Rusciano, Right
to Counsel in Restoration of Rights Cases, 42 BIFOCAL 75, 76 (Mar. 11, 2021) (“Historically, we have
denied people with disabilities the right to marry, to attend school, to reproduce, and to live among us.
Even as recently as the 1960s, it was very easy for people with mental illness and developmental
disabilities in the United States to be ‘committed’ to secure facilities with relatively little procedure or
focus on their rights or their humanity. This legacy continues to infect our guardianship proceedings by
reinforcing the stereotypes and assumptions that people with disabilities are incapable of managing their
own lives.”).
232. Pollock & Rusciano, supra note 231, at 76.
233. See supra Part II.A.
234. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-307 (2021).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights for Adults Under Guardianship, 36 BIFOCAL 63, 64 (Feb.
1, 2015).
238. Id. at 63.
239. Id. Even if the protected person can obtain a medical evaluation to prove their competency, they
are still subject to discriminatory determinations of capacity by judges. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.
240. See BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 110–17.
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Because of the availability of lesser restrictive alternatives, the use of
stereotyping to create the discriminatory classification, and the high burden on
individuals improperly subject to guardianship, it is likely that the state’s
guardianship structure would not withstand intermediate scrutiny.
IV.

REMEDIES

New Mexico’s statutory use and implementation of guardianship violates
both the due process rights and equal protection rights of people with I/DD. To
remedy this unconstitutional mechanism of decision-making supports, the state must
adopt a less restrictive alternative that both honors the right of people with I/DD to
the least restrictive form of intervention and is less ripe for discriminatory abuse. The
most salient option is for the state to adopt supported decision-making241 as the legal
default option of decision-making intervention for adults in need of supports and to
require exhaustion of less restrictive forms of intervention before guardianship is
pursued.
Additionally, the passage of the New Mexico Civil Rights Act242 has created
the possibility of people who are improperly placed in guardianships to bring a
private suit for monetary damages against government agencies that
unconstitutionally impose guardianships. The availability of this private right of
action may lead to increased litigation on the unconstitutionality of guardianship
which could be an avenue for state courts to recognize the substantive right to the
least restrictive form of intervention.
A.

Requiring Exhaustion of Less-Restrictive Methods of Intervention

Currently, petitioners for guardianship in New Mexico have the burden of
demonstrating that lesser restrictive means of intervention have been considered and
why those lesser restrictive means are “insufficient to meet the alleged incapacitated
person’s . . . need.”243 Additionally, the court can only appoint a guardian only if
“guardianship is appropriate as the least restrictive form of intervention. . . . “244
However, as previously discussed, courts often make improper determinations of an
alleged incapacitated person’s capacity that leaves this statutory safeguard
essentially moot.245 The state has taken on the responsibility of providing care to
those who the state believes cannot care for themselves; to live up to this selfimposed obligation, the state must require petitioners for guardianship to exhaust
less-restrictive methods of decision-making restraints for people with I/DD before
the court can impose a guardianship. By legally recognizing and defining less
restrictive means of intervention within the existing guardianship statutory scheme,
including supported decision-making, the imposition of an exhaustion requirement
would more properly protect the rights of individuals who are deemed incapacitated.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra Part II.B.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4A-1 to -13 (2021).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(B)(4) (2021).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-304(C)(4) (2021).
See supra Part II.A.
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Statutory recognition of supported decision-making and the removal of
limited guardianship as the default method of decision-making restraints on an
individual combats both the substantive due process and equal protection violations
that arise from the imposition of guardianships. The New Mexico legislature is aware
of supported decision-making as a less restrictive alternative to guardianship. In
2018, a bill was introduced that would have formally recognized supported decisionmaking as a less restrictive alternative to guardianship.246 However, the enacted
version does not include a reference to supported decision-making.247 In 2020,
several bills were introduced that, had they passed, would have appropriated funds
for the creation of a task force to study supported decision-making as an alternative
to guardianship in New Mexico.248 In 2021, a similar bill was introduced to fund the
creation of a task force.249 While that bill failed, $15,000 “[t]o fund a task force to
develop and recommend legislation around supported decision-making” was passed
in the House appropriations bill.250 State lawmakers certainly recognize the need to
find alternatives to guardianship for people with I/DD,251 and yet have made
frustratingly small steps to implement supported decision-making as an alternative.
A number of other states have passed comprehensive legislation related to
supported decision-making. As of 2021, 10 states and the District of Columbia
enacted statutes formally recognizing supported decision-making agreements.252
However, these statutes may be “ultimately inconsistent with the supported decisionmaking model and may undermine its stated goals of empowering individuals with
disabilities.”253 While these statutes give rights to supporters and protect third parties
who rely in good faith on supported decision-making agreements, they fail to expand
the rights of individuals with I/DD.254 Even though the passage of these statutes has
246. S.B. 19, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2018). Fiscal impact reports and committee reports for
S.B. 19 did not provide any information on why the provision including supported decision-making was
removed from the final bill.
247. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-107 (2021).
248. H.B. 67, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2020); H.M. 23, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2020).
249. H.B. 94, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021). The legislation would have appropriated $35,000
for a task force; the Developmental Disabilities Planning Council (“DDPC”), which would have been
responsible for the task force, estimated that at least $35,000 would be needed to adequately staff the task
force. Id.
250. H.B. 2, § 5(72), 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021). However, see the discussion in supra note
249—$15,000 is not enough to adequately fund the task force.
251. N.M. LEGIS. FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT HOUSE BILL 94, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Jan.
26, 2021) (“DDPC also reported without the establishment of an alternatives [sic] to guardianship such as
SDM, the rise in guardianship requests may overwhelm the system.”).
252. See generally Supported Decision-Making Agreements Act, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.56.010–
.195 (West 2020); Supported Decision-Making Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9401a–9410a (West
2020); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2131–2134 (West, through Feb. 3, 2021); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-14-1–13
(West 2020); Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act, LA. ACT 258 (2020); Supported DecisionMaking Act, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162c.010–.300 (West 2020); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-36-01
to 30.1-36-08 (West 2019); Supported Decision-Making Act, 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-66.13-1–10
(West 2020); Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act, TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.001–.102 (West
2019); Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective Agreements Act, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.130.001–.915 (West 2021); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 52.01–.32 (West
2019).
253. See Kohn, supra note 77, at 327.
254. Id. at 333.
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been hailed as an advancement for “the rights of individuals with disabilities,” the
statutes uniformly do not provide a right to make decisions with supporters that will
be recognized by third-parties, nor do they provide a right to a “fiduciary level of
care from the supporter.”255
In contrast to these states, New Mexico should recognize supported
decision-making by expanding existing public guardianship programs to include the
provision and facilitation of decision-making support.256 Further, in drafting
legislation, legislators should be mindful of achieving the goal of recognizing the
autonomy and rights of people with I/DD.257 New Mexico must statutorily recognize
the rights of people with I/DD to the least restrictive form of intervention and impose
an affirmative duty of care on supporters to ensure supported decision-making does
not permit the same kinds of abuse that guardianship has. Supported decision-making
has the potential to empower individuals with I/DD to “retain ultimate legal decisionmaking authority.”258 The benefits of supported decision-making are far reaching;
people with I/DD who are allowed to exercise greater self-determination have better
life outcomes and quality of life.259 Legal recognition of supported decision-making
is the first step for New Mexico to adequately recognize people’s right to the least
restrictive form of intervention and to prohibit unconstitutional discrimination in the
imposition of guardianships.
Moreover, rather than simply codifying a state-sponsored supported
decision-making agreement, New Mexico must also require supported decisionmaking be attempted and found to be an inappropriate method of support for the
individual before a court can limit the individual’s decision-making rights via
guardianship. The legislature should amend the state guardianship scheme to require
exhaustion of less restrictive means of decision-making supports before
guardianships can be imposed by the courts.260 First, the exhaustion requirement
would make it far less likely, if not impossible, for judges to default to restrictive
plenary guardianships.261 Second, requiring petitioners to prove that a more
restrictive means of intervention is necessary for an individual makes it harder to
achieve those more restrictive means, such as guardianship, thus discouraging actors
from unwarrantably seeking guardianships. Third, supported decision-making

255. Id. at 329. For example, the right to a fiduciary level of care from supporters would mean the
supporter owes the individual duties of “acting in good faith, with loyalty and without self-interest, and
avoiding conflicts of interest.” Id. at 330.
256. See id. at 355 (“Expanding the scope of public guardianship programs to include public supporter
programs would be consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act’s integration mandate requiring
that public entities provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate to meet the needs of persons
with disabilities.”).
257. See Rachel Mattingly Phillips, Model Language for Supported Decision-Making Statutes, 98
WASH. U. L. REV. 615 (2020).
258. BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 131.
259. Id.
260. Such legislation would have to include a limited exception for the exhaustion requirement in
cases where guardianship is necessary to provide support for an individual. Requiring petitioners prove
by “clear and convincing” evidence that exhaustion is not appropriate, and thus an immediate imposition
of guardianship is appropriate, could work.
261. See supra Part II.A.

544

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

agreements are easier to modify and extinguish than guardianship agreements,262
which more appropriately reflects people with I/DD’s changing capacity over
time.263 Finally, while the discriminatory biases that color the implementation of
guardianships would not be eliminated by an exhaustion requirement, requiring
petitioners to attempt less restrictive forms of decision-making support means that
judges will have more information available to make an informed, unbiased decision
when implementing guardianships.
New Mexico’s guardianship statute “should be amended to explicitly
prohibit the use of guardianship where supported decision-making would meet the
individual’s needs.”264 The approach proposed by the Uniform Guardianship,
Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements Act (“UGCOPAA”)265 is to
appoint guardians only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence266 that
“the respondent’s identified needs cannot be met by a protective arrangement instead
of guardianship or other less restrictive alternative.”267 This heightened burden on
the petitioner for adult guardianship makes it harder for guardianships to be
unwarrantably implemented. New Mexico is progressive in that it has already
requires judges to find by clear and convincing evidence a guardianship is warranted
before one can be implemented.268 However, this heightened evidentiary standard is
not enough when determinations of capacity are based on stereotypes, as is
unfortunately the case all too often.269 Only a prohibition on the implementation of
guardianship until less restrictive means of intervention, like supported decisionmaking agreements, have been attempted.
By implementing supported decision-making as the default option for
limiting someone’s decision-making rights and putting the burden on the petitioner
to show why a more restrictive means is appropriate for an individual, New Mexico
can finally take the steps necessary to ensure people’s rights are not unnecessarily
and unjustifiably restricted via guardianship. Recognition and implementation of
supported decision-making as the default method of decision-making restriction
emphasizes that people with I/DD have rights and autonomy.
B.

Private Right of Action Under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act

Under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act, a person who has been deprived
of any rights, privileges, or immunities pursuant to the bill of rights of the New
Mexico Constitution due to the acts or omissions of a public body or person acting

262. What is Supported Decision-Making?, supra note 59.
263. BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 31, at 89 (“Most guardianship orders are not time-limited
and so last until the subject’s death or a court modification or termination of the order, even though an
individual’s capacity can change over time.”).
264. This proposed statutory amendment comes from Kohn, supra note 77, at 350.
265. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP & OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT §
102(31) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) [hereinafter UGCPOPAA].
266. Clear and convincing means the evidence is substantially more likely to be true than untrue.
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
267. UGCPOPAA, supra note 244, § 301(a)(1)(B).
268. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-304(C) (2021).
269. See supra Part II.A.
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on behalf of a public body has a private right of action.270 Thus, under the Civil
Rights Act people with I/DD who are unconstitutionally subject to guardianship
potentially have a basis to sue a state agency for deprivation of their due process and
equal protection rights. The use of a private right of action in these cases may provide
opportunities for state courts to define the right to the least restrictive form of
intervention and could provide a remedy for people who have been
unconstitutionally restricted by guardianships.
Prior to the enactment of the New Mexico Civil Rights Act in the summer
of 2021, there was a “lack of a means to assert state constitutional rights.”271 The
only available mechanisms for enforcing a state constitutional right were to seek
injunctive relief or file a suit for declaratory judgment—two forms of equitable
proceedings allowing a plaintiff to secure non-monetary relief for the violation of a
right.272 Local practitioners hypothesize that New Mexico courts have not used the
state constitution to expand the civil rights of New Mexicans because there was little
incentive for attorneys to pursue these cases.273 Now, with the New Mexico Civil
Rights Act, which allows for monetary damages in cases of state constitutional
claims,274 there is a greater incentive for attorneys to bring civil cases challenging
state violations of an individual’s constitutional rights and for judges to expand the
civil rights of New Mexicans. Thus, it is possible that cases aimed at unconstitutional
uses of guardianship could lead state courts to recognize the right to the least
restrictive form of intervention and find the state’s guardianship scheme is
unconstitutional.
To bring an action under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act, a public body,
or a public actor, must have deprived a potential plaintiff of a constitutional right.275
Any action brought pursuant to the New Mexico Civil Rights Act must be brought
against a public body.276 In most, if not all, guardianship cases, the public actor is the
district court judge who imposes an order of guardianship. Judges, however, are
immune from monetary liability “for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in
excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly.”277 The New Mexico Civil Rights Act does not waive judicial

270. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-3(B) (2021).
271. Linda M. Vanzi, Andrew G. Schultz & Melanie B. Stambaugh, State Constitutional Litigation in
New Mexico: All Shield and No Sword, 48(2) N.M. L. REV. 302, 306 (2018).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 302.
274. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-3(B) (2021) (“A person who claims to have suffered a deprivation of
any rights . . . may maintain an action to establish liability and recover actual damages. . . . .”); id. § 414A-5 (2021) (“In any action brought under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act, the court may, in its
discretion, allow a prevailing plaintiff or plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs to be paid by the
defendant.”).
275. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-3(B) (2021).
276. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-3(C) (2021). A “public body” for purposes of the New Mexico Civil
Rights Act is a “state or local government, an advisory board, a commission, an agency or an entity created
by the constitution of New Mexico or any branch of government that receives public funding. . . .” Id. §
41-4A-2 (2021).
277. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 365 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871))
(defining the common law doctrine of judicial immunity).
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immunity;278 therefore, an individual unconstitutionally deprived of their rights
through a judicially imposed guardianship would not be able to use the New Mexico
Civil Rights Act to challenge the guardianship order.
However, a constitutional challenge could be brought by the “perfect
plaintiff.”279 Petitions for guardianship are initiated by an individual who has an
interest in the welfare of the person to be protected.280 This “interested person” can
be a public actor—in New Mexico, the Developmental Disabilities Council’s Office
of Guardianship (“OOG”) can act as an interested person and petition the court for
appointment of a guardian.281 If the OOG—a public body—petitioned for the
appointment of a guardian on behalf of a protected person, the protected
person/plaintiff may have a cause of action under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act
because they were deprived of their right to the least restrictive form of intervention
and to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability.
Additionally, an individual who is appointed a public guardian may have a
cause of action. Typically, courts appoint a family member to serve as a guardian for
a person in need of decision-making support.282 However, if no family member is
available or able to take on the responsibility of a guardianship, a professional
guardian may be appointed instead. In New Mexico, the OOG is a publicly funded
agency that contracts with professional guardians to provide guardianship services
for protected persons who do not have individuals in their life who can act as a
guardian and who are income eligible.283 Thus, an individual who is appointed a
guardian provided by the OOG may have a cause of action under the New Mexico
Civil Rights Act for the OOG’s deprivation of the protected person’s rights to the
least restrictive form of support and to equal protection due to the appointment of a
public guardian.
In specific circumstances, the New Mexico Civil Rights Act could be an
avenue for individuals with I/DD to challenge the constitutionality of guardianship,
for the right to the least restrictive means of intervention to be recognized, and for
plaintiffs to recover monetary damages for unconstitutional uses of guardianship.
However, the herculean burden of civil rights litigation would be difficult to take on
for many, let alone individuals who have been stripped of their decision-making
rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

“The #FreeBritney movement has drawn international attention to the
conservatorship of Britney Spears, but though her celebrity is exceptional, her

278. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-10 (2021).
279. See, e.g., Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Supreme Court Lawsuits in Search of a Plaintiff,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 16, 2018, 1:58 P.M.), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-andpractice/supreme-court-lawsuits-in-search-of-a-plaintiff (“The pursuit for a perfect test case isn’t new . . .
Public interest lawyers on both the right and the left often seek out plaintiffs and initiate litigation
specifically to change the law. . . .”).
280. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(A) (2021).
281. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-16B-3 (2021).
282. Guardians and Conservators, NEW MEXICO COURTS, https://adultguardianship.nmcourts.gov/.
283. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-16B-3(B)(1) (2021).
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predicament is far from unique.”284 The number of people confined by a guardianship
at any time is unknown; as a result we know there are problems with the institution,
but we have no idea the true scope.285 New Mexico’s use of guardianship infringes
on individuals with I/DD’s equal protection rights and right to the least restrictive
form of intervention under the New Mexico constitution. Because of New Mexico’s
ability to grant greater constitutional protections than those that are available under
the United States constitution, guardianship could be challenged and found
unconstitutional under the state constitution. As an alternative, the state should
implement supported decision-making as the less restrictive alternative to
guardianship, requiring that petitioners for decision-making restrictions prove that a
more restrictive means is necessary for an individual. Recognition of the autonomy
of people with I/DD and their ability to make informed decisions is the only way
New Mexico can honor the due process and equal protection rights of these
individuals.

284. Katie J.M. Baker & Heidi Blake, “My Human Rights are Being Violated”: Fighting a Family
Conservatorship,
BUZZFEED
NEWS,
(Sep.
20,
2021,
10:09
A.M.)
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/katiejmbaker/family-guardianship-conservatorshipdisabilities?bfsource=relatedmanual.
285. Godfrey, supra note 3, at 84.

